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1. Introduction 
 
It is well recognized in the economic literature that global environmental 
problems require a global solution, that is, cooperation among the involved countries. It is 
also established that the absence of cooperation leads to the under-provision of pollution 
mitigation compared to the level optimal from a global standpoint. Countries interested in 
their own welfare tend to spend less on pollution mitigation. Because mitigating a global 
pollutant means contributing to a public good, it cannot be globally optimal without some 
coordination among countries. However, a country’s environmental policy facing a 
global pollutant is not limited to mitigation. Recently, a new policy instrument appeared 
in the policy debate, namely, the environmental adaptation. In short, the adaptation 
consists in protecting a country from the adverse effects of pollution. When a country is 
unable to effectively control pollutions, for example, because of the lack of international 
cooperation, then adaptation is an open option of domestic policy that may be effective. 
Instead of spending money in vein on mitigation, the country may have an interest in 
spending on adaptation. The striking difference between mitigation and adaptation is that 
the former contributes to a public good while the latter is led by pure selfishness, to be 
understood here as the country’s self interest. The intuition thus suggests that the lack of 
cooperation should lead to too little mitigation and too much adaptation. To justify this 
intuition, we must understand a country’ motive to invest in mitigation and adaptation in 
a multi-country setting, that is, understand how optimal domestic policies are shaped by 
international cooperation.       
The emerging literature on the optimal policy mix between mitigation and 
adaptation usually considers the adaptation as a spare wheel when mitigation fails. In this 
paper we question this statement. We will show that a much wider picture should be 
discussed when comparing domestic environmental policies under international 
cooperation and no-cooperation. This issue is of a major importance in designing 
effective environmental policies, and a key policy message of this paper is that the 
debates about international agreements and domestic policies should not be considered as 
separate issues.  
During the last years, the literature devoted to managing global commons used to 
start from the top-level design of an international agreement and then scaled down to the 
nation level to find a domestic policy compatible with the international agreement, 
notably in terms of incentives (is the country willing to join the agreement?). Empirical 
evidence suggests that such an approach is ineffective. On one hand, the climate change 
multilateral negotiation process undergone on behalf of the United Nations Framework 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has failed to deliver concrete outcomes for many years.1 
On the other hand, despite the slow pace of the UNFCCC process, several domestic 
initiatives (at the national or sub-national levels) have been recently documented. A 
remarkable example is the GLOBE International initiative. GLOBE International was 
originally founded in 1989 by legislators from the US Congress, European Parliament, 
Japanese Diet and the Russian State Duma with the mission to respond to urgent 
environmental challenges through the development and advancement of national 
                                                
1Let us wait for Paris COP conference in 2015 to be conclusive. 
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legislation.2 Fankhauser et al. (2014) have recently analyzed national and international 
factors that drive the adoption of legislation on climate change with a unique dataset of 
419 national legislation pieces from 63 countries. They showed that the passage to 
climate legislation is influenced by both domestic and international factors. This new 
perspective suggests that a positive policy context at the local level may eventually scale 
up at the global level and help an international agreement to come out. Their main 
conclusion warns against focusing too narrowly on international treaties as the sole 
solution to the climate problem, while domestic actions might be a possible route to 
unlock the stalemate in international negotiations. Indeed, strong interactions exist 
between the top and bottom parts when it comes to managing global commons.  
A recent interesting theoretic tentative to bridge this top-down gap was proposed 
by Olstrom (2012) under the collective bi-disciplinary (economics and political sciences) 
research project initiated by Brousseau et al. (2012). Actually, a new strand of thinking is 
emerging that attempts to circumvent well-known drawbacks of the common top-down 
approach. A necessary ingredient for its success is better understanding how international 
agreements shape domestic policies, which is the purpose of our paper.  
As it will be shown in the literature review (Section 2), the current research 
provides only partial answers to these questions. In this paper, we propose a 
comprehensive analysis of the key ingredients for economic growth and environmental 
policy in a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium setting. We consider the main 
drivers of economic growth, namely, investment in physical capital, investment in 
environmental adaptation, and spending on pollution mitigation. Our main findings can 
be summarized as follows.  
We will first consider the simple case of a single country with the rest-of-the-
world represented by a given exogenous external pollution stock. This setting will 
actually allow us to understand the effects related to the asymmetry among countries. The 
optimal adaptation policy depends on a combination of three factors, each of them having 
a strong economic rationale. First, the physical-technological potential for adaptation 
must be large enough, which is related to the country’s geographical and physical 
characteristics. A country located is an area highly sensitive to global warming will 
probably have a wider technological potential than other countries. Second, the 
opportunity cost and incentive to invest in pollution abatement increase with the 
country’s pollution level. The first two factors suggest that mitigation and adaptation may 
well be either substitutable or complementary policy instruments depending on the 
economy under analysis.  Third, the wealth of the economy also plays a key role: a 
wealthier economy may have a stronger incentive to invest in adaptation than in 
mitigation, and it is optimal not to invest in adaptation if the economy is too poor. When 
discussing these factors, we will introduce a synthetic indicator of country’s 
environmental harm and vulnerability, both for mathematical and economic purposes. It 
will prove to be an appealing indicator for policy support.  
                                                
2 The main publication is the GLOBE Climate Legislation Study (fourth edition). The Study is produced in 
partnership with the Grantham Institute at the London School of Economics and serves to baseline existing 
climate laws and regulation. It has been widely recognized for highlighting the growing trend of national 
climate change legislation. See: http://globelegislators.org.  
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This one-country setting allows us to analyze how the size of the economy 
influences its domestic policy. We show that the larger contribution of an economy to the 
global pollution stock leads to larger output, capital stock, and mitigation spending. 
Furthermore, a stronger environmental harmfulness reinforces this relationship. Optimal 
adaptation decisions are more challenging to understand. The optimal adaptation 
spending depends on both the harmfulness of the economy and its size. If the harmfulness 
is high, then optimal adaptation first increases and later decreases with the size of the 
economy. This is an important counter-intuitive result that would require to be 
empirically documented. It reveals that adaptation is not driven by selfishness only. 
Then we consider a multi-country model. For the sake of clarity we will start with 
two countries before generalizing to n countries, n > 2. Indeed, all the results displayed 
for two countries will hold for n countries. We restrict the analysis to symmetric 
countries in steady state. In such a setting, two polar scenarios can be considered, namely 
non-cooperative and cooperative. The former corresponds to Nash equilibrium, the latter 
to a first-best Pareto solution. Comparing these two scenarios leads to a natural result, 
that the global pollution level is too high in the non-cooperative scenario with respect to 
the first best. Still, the reasons why it happens are not trivial. The first unexpected result 
(never mentioned in the literature to the best of our knowledge) is that the size of the 
economies significantly differs in the above two scenarios. The optimal size of the 
economy at steady state is always larger in the non-cooperative scenario than under 
cooperation. The lack of cooperation in the global pollution problem yields too fat 
economies, where not only pollution is too high, but also output, capital and 
consumption. Because countries cannot effectively control the global pollution level in 
the Nash scenario, they have no choice but to spend more on mitigation and adaptation, 
and because they need income for this purpose, more production and capital 
accumulation are required. We show that, expressed in terms of output, mitigation efforts 
are indeed too small in Nash scenario as it is well known in the literature, but mitigation 
expenses are larger compared to what they could be under cooperation because the whole 
economy is too fat. This is a wasteful economy where people work hard to get income to 
be able to spend a lot of money to cope with pollution. We also show that this 
wastefulness increases with the degree of environmental harmfulness.  
The optimal policy ratio between adaptation and mitigation displays an inverse U-
shape with respect to the stage of development of the economy (represented by its total 
factor productivity), as in Bréchet et al. (2013). In other words, mitigation and adaptation 
are complementary policy instruments for poor countries but become substitutes at some 
higher stage of development. A new result is that cooperation moves this inverse U-shape 
to the left. As a consequence, optimal adaptation becomes positive for smaller values of 
the total productivity in Nash than under cooperation, and the maximum of the optimal 
ratio between adaptation and mitigation is reached at a smaller total productivity value. 
This result has major implications for the current policy debate. It shows that the lack of 
cooperation does not necessarily lead to too much adaptation, but rather to too little 
adaptation in poor countries. It suggests that more should be spent in international 
adaptation funds to help developing countries in the absence of effective cooperation, 
which is a sensitive policy issue in the current international negotiation process.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. Section 3 introduces the model of a single country in a global environment, i.e., 
with a given exogenous pollution flow coming from the rest of the world. This 
preliminary setting will conveniently allow us to show how asymmetry among countries 
shapes domestic policies. We will prove the existence and uniqueness of a steady state 
and produce qualitative results about optimal mitigation and adaptation policies. In this 
section, we will also obtain approximate analytic formulas necessary for further analysis 
of a multi-country world. Section 4 investigates the case of several countries. For the sake 
of clarity, we will start with a competitive two-country world (Section 4.1), i.e. a 
dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following 
the open-loop Nash equilibrium. A social planner problem, where decisions are taken by 
an international governmental body on the behalf of all countries, is described in Section 
4.2. The choice of the Nash open-loop over feedback strategy and the comparison of 
Nash and cooperative scenarios are discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides a 
generalization of major outcomes to n > 2 countries. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Literature review 
The current literature provides only partial insights to the question of the 
connection between domestic policies and international cooperation for a global 
common. It is mostly restricted to the applied integrated assessment modeling 
frameworks proposed by de Bruin et al. (2009a), de Bruin et al. (2009b), Bosello (2008), 
Bosello et al. (2010). A more theoretic strand is represented by Tulkens and van 
Steenberghe (2009), Buob and Stephan (2011) and Ebert and Welsch (2012). Let us 
review the main contributions of the aforementioned papers.  
De Bruin et al. (2009a) and de Bruin et al. (2009b) consider aggregate adaptation 
expenditures as an endogenous flow variable in the numerical DICE model. They obtain 
that adaptation and mitigation are complementary policy instruments, adaptation is 
stronger in the short run, mitigation stronger in the long run, and adaptation is better for 
low environmental damages. Bosello (2008) considers aggregate adaptation expenditures 
as an endogenous stock variable of the RICE model and argues that the optimal 
mitigation starts earlier, adaptation is postponed, and mitigation is better for low 
damages. The later work of Bosello et al. (2010) distinguishes between three adaptation 
categories and mitigation in the AD-WITCH optimal growth model of the 12-region 
world. All these papers focus on computational models rather than providing theoretical 
insights. 
The first theoretic paper related to our research is Tulkens and van Steenberghe 
(2009). They extend the standard cost minimization model (called “c+d” for abatement 
costs and damage costs minimization) by including adaptation costs explicitly in the 
damage function. They characterize the optimal (cost minimizing) balance between 
policy options (abatement, adaptation, and suffering) in both static and dynamic settings. 
Tulkens and van Steenberghe show that, in the cooperative solution, the optimal 
adaptation level at any time t is such that its marginal cost is equal to the discounted 
value of future suffered damages that adaptation allows to avoid. This suggests how 
adaptation and mitigation ought, in their view, to complement each other.  
 6 
Two other analytic papers, Buob and Stephan (2011) and Ebert and Welsch 
(2012), use game-theoretic framework to analyze adaptation and mitigation in a multi-
country setting. Buob and Stephan (2011) study a two-stage dynamic game of several 
identical regions with cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. They focus on the 
fundamental difference that adaptation benefits are private to a region while mitigation 
benefits are globally public. Some of their major qualitative conclusions are that poor 
countries should invest only in mitigation while rich countries should invest in both 
mitigation and adaptation. Thus, these countries provide public benefits of mitigation 
even in the case of non-cooperative behavior. Furthermore, the range of income for 
which the countries engage in adaptation is smaller under cooperation than under no-
cooperation. Our analysis confirms and extends the results of Buob and Stephan (2011). 
Such coincidence is surprising given the differences between the modeling approaches. 
Ebert and Welsch (2012) consider a two-country static game with endogenous 
production, pollution emissions, and adaptation expenditures, but they do not explicitly 
model mitigation expenditures. They come to a related conclusion that a larger 
productivity of emissions and larger adaptive capacity lead to greater emissions, in the 
home country and globally, in both cases of non-cooperative behavior and full 
cooperation. Moreover, they emphasize the controversial nature of this effect for policy 
making.  
In this paper we contribute to the literature by proposing a full-fledged multi-
country dynamic general equilibrium model to address the optimal combination of 
domestic policy instruments, pollution mitigation, adaptation to the degraded state of the 
environment, and capital accumulation. In particular, we aim to investigate how the 
optimal policy depends on the stage of development of a country and its position on the 
international area. Total factor productivity and the rate of time preference are among the 
main characteristics of a country’s stage of development, and its power in international 
negotiations can be represented by the country’s contribution to the global pollution flow. 
Also, despite the fact that there clearly exist big polluters and small polluters, there is no 
straight link between the amount of pollution and the stage of development. A developed 
country may be a small polluter (e.g. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Belgium) 
while a developing country may well be a big polluter (e.g. China, India, Brazil).3 We 
will study how such heterogeneities affect domestic policies. 
For pedagogical motives, before building the multi-country model we will start 
with a simpler one-country model with an external pollution flow. It will highlight some 
key preliminary results that will be useful in understanding the multi-country model.  
 
3. A single country in a global environment  
 
We consider a country that is a part of the larger multi-country world and 
aggregate the rest of the world into a single exogenous zone. The country under study 
                                                
3 Some countries contribution to world greenhouse gases emissions in 2006 (in million tons of CO2 
equivalent for all GHGs, and in percent): USA 7,017.3 (24.5%); Russia Federation 2,190.2 (7.6%); 
Belgium 136.9 (0.5%); Switzerland 53.2 (0.2%); source: UNFCCC, FCCC/SBI/2008/12. China 3,649.8 
(12.7%); Brazil 1,477.1 (5.1%); India 1,228.5 (4.2%); South Africa 361.2 (1.2%); Singapore 26.8 (0.1%); 
source UNFCCC, FCCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2. 
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determines its optimal national policy by taking the rest of the world as given. It thus 
represents a Nash equilibrium constrained by exogenous players, i.e. a game where one 
player (it could be generalized to n endogenous players) determines its optimal strategy 
while all other players have fixed strategies. As it is commonly assumed in the literature, 
the only interaction between countries is the global climate. So, the rest of the world can 
be represented as an exogenous pollution flow. This flow complements the endogenous 
country’s contribution to the global pollution, as the sum of the two matches the world’s 
pollution flow. Interestingly, such a simple modeling framework will allow us to analyze 
how optimal domestic policies are shaped by the size of the country under study. This is 
an innovative and convenient way of addressing asymmetry among countries in global 
pollution games: to what extent the optimal domestic policy would change with the 
contribution of the country to global pollution?4 
 
3.1. Economic-environmental model of a country with external pollution stock 
 
As in Bréchet et al. (2013), the endogenous country is described by the Solow-
Swan one-sector model with a Cobb-Douglas technology. A benevolent social planner 
allocates the aggregate final product Y across consumption C, investment IK into physical 
capital K, investment ID into environmental adaptation D, and pollution mitigation 
expenditures B. The intertemporal utility depends positively on the consumption C, 
negatively on pollution P, and positively on adaptation D. The programme of the social 
planner is to maximize the utility of the infinitely lived representative household:  
dttDtPtCUe t
CII DK
∫
∞
−
0,,
)](),(),([max ρ
     
(1) 
IK(t)≥0,   ID(t) ≥0,     C(t) ≥0,        
subject to the following constraints:  
Y(t) = AKα(t) = IK(t) + ID(t)  + B(t)+ C(t),                           (2) 
K ’(t) = IK(t) −δKK(t),       K(0)=K0,                                                      (3) 
D ’(t) = ID(t) −δDD(t),      D(0)=D0,                                                      (4) 
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, A > 0 and 0 <α < 1 are parameters of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, δK ≥ 0 and δD ≥ 0 are deterioration rates of physical 
capital and adaptation capital. Eq. (2) is the economy budget constraint. Eqs. (3) and (4) 
describe capital accumulation of productive physical capital and adaptation capital. It is 
assumed that economic activity Y increases the pollution stock P, which negatively enters 
the utility function (1), while mitigation expenditures B allow to partially alleviating this 
adverse impact of the pollution stock. It must be stressed that the endogenous economy 
only contributes to a part of the worldwide pollution flow, while it suffers from the global 
                                                
4It must be stressed that “country size” and “country’s contribution to climate change” are two different 
realities in an asymmetric world. Two countries with similar GDPs may well have very different pollution 
levels. Only the latter matters in our multi-country setting. For example, Canada and Spain had almost the 
same GDP level in 2011 (around 1400 billion US$, source: OECD) while GHGs emissions were twice  
larger in Canada (source: UNFCCC).  
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pollution stock. The externality typical to a public good appears here, as well as the 
asymmetry between adaptation and mitigation at the country level. 
As explained in the beginning of this Section, the rest of the world is represented 
by an exogenous pollution flow, denoted by Z. The dynamics of the global pollution 
stock P is given by: 
P ’(t) = −δPP(t) + γ[Y(t)/B(t)+ Z(t)],       P(0) = P0,   (5)  
 
where γ > 0 is the emission factor (the environmental dirtiness of the economy) and δP > 
0 is the natural pollution decay rate.5 The pollution flow of the endogenous economy can 
be mitigated by mitigation spending B, as in Gradus and Smulders (1993). In this setting, 
by choosing Z, we are able to analyze how the optimal environmental policy of the 
country under study depends on its share in the global pollution flow. So, one of the key 
innovative features of this model is to endogenize both mitigation and adaptation as 
domestic policy measures in the presence of an external exogenous pollution stock. 
Let us consider that the utility function (1) is as follows: 
                    U(C, P, D) = U1(C) − U2(P, D) 
µ
η
µ
+
−=
+
1
)(ln
1PDC ,   (6) 
where the function η(D) represents the vulnerability of the economy to pollution and the 
parameter µ > 0 reflects the increasing marginal disutility of pollution. Let us precise our 
assumptions on these functions. 
In the environmental game theory literature (e.g., Breton et al. 2006, Fanokoa et 
al. 2011, Legras and Zaccour 2011), U1(C) is considered as the net revenue (gross 
revenue minus production cost) and U2(P) is as a damage function (the cost of 
environmental damage to the economy). Both are usually assumed to be quadratic or 
linear, but it will not necessarily be the case in our setting. Adaptation expenditures D 
enter the economy as a means to reduce the environmental vulnerability of the economy 
η(D), i.e., the adverse economic costs of a given pollution stock level. This function 
deserves some attention. It is natural to assume that vulnerability is maximal when no 
adaptation measures are taken, ηmax = η(0), and that vulnerability gradually decreases to 
some minimum level when the adaptation efforts tend to infinity, ηmin = η(∞) > 0. The 
potential gap ηmax− ηmin represents the range of physical adaptation opportunities in the 
economy as it depends on the geographical or infrastructural characteristics of the 
country. In between this physical gap, the economic concept of efficiency must be 
introduced. It is done by the parameter a, which reflects the marginal efficiency of 
adaptation. In the remainder of the paper the functional form of effective adaptation will 
be as follows: 
aDeD −−+= )()( minmaxmin ηηηη ,   minmax ηη > > 0,   a > 0.        (7) 
We are now equipped with the model of a country that confronts the global 
climate change, for which it is only partially responsible, and chooses its optimal climate 
                                                
5For tractability reasons, we assume that γ is the same in the country under study and in the rest of the 
world.  
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policy, which consists of emission mitigation and adaptation spending. To analyze the 
country’s optimal domestic policy, we will characterize the steady state economy. 
 
3.2. Steady-state analysis 
 
The optimization problem (1)-(5) includes three control variables IK, ID, C, and 
four state variables K, D, B, P, related by four constraints-equalities (2)-(5). In order to 
keep the analytic complexity feasible for the forthcoming multi-country case, we restrict 
ourselves to the steady–state analysis assuming Z(t) = const. We also assume that capital 
depreciation is the same for physical and adaptation capital stocks (δK = δD = δ). The 
structure of possible stationary solutions is described in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 (Steady state). The optimization problem (1)-(7) possesses a stationary state (
K , B , C , D , P ): 
,/)( αδρα +−= KKAB      (8) 
),(/)( DKKC +−+= δαδρ  ,KIK δ=  ,DID δ=   (9) 
,
/)(1 ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+−
=
−
Z
KA
AP
P αδρδ
γ
α
     (10) 
where , 0< ( ) )1/(1)/( αδρα −+< AK and  D ≥0 are determined in the following way. 
First, the optimal capital stock >0 when optimal adaptation is zero (D =0) is the 
unique solution of the following equation: 
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+
+
=
+−
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+−
++
−
−−
−
δ
α
δρ
δρδα
ηργαδρ
αδρ µ
µµ
α
αµ
α
PP
A
K
KAZ
KA
A
)(
)/)((
/)(
max
11
1
21
1
, (11) 
provided the calculated value is small enough. Otherwise, positive adaptation and 
capital stocks >0 and D >0 are determined by the following system of two nonlinear 
equations:  
[ ],)(
)(
)/)((
/)(
maxmaxmin
1
21
1
Da
PP
eDKKA
K
KAZ
KA
A
−
+
−
−−
−
−+⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −−
+
+
=
+−
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+−
ηηηδδ
α
δρ
δρδα
ργ
αδρ
αδρ
µ
µ
α
αµ
α
  (12) 
1
11
1
maxmax /)()1(
)(
−−
−+
+
−
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+−
=
+
−⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −−
+
µ
αµ
µ
αδρµρδ
γ
ηηδδ
α
δρ Z
KA
AeaDKK
P
Da
(13) 
Proof:  see Appendix. 
Analyzing the existence of positive solutions for D  and K  in the two nonlinear 
equations (12)-(13) is not straightforward. In particular, it turns out to be extremely 
K
K
K
K
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difficult when δ> 0, even with Z = 0 (see Yatsenko et al. 2014). So we restrict ourselves 
to the case δ  = 0 of zero deterioration.    
At δ = 0, solving the system of two equations (12)-(13) in Lemma 1 is reduced to 
a single equation. Indeed, Eq. (13) becomes 
1
11
1
minmax /)()1(
)(
−−
−+
+
−
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
=
+
−
µ
αµ
µ
αρµαδ
γ
ηη Z
KA
AKea
P
Da
 
(14)    
and can be solved for D at a given K as:  
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−+
−
=
+
−+
+ 1
11
1
minmax
/)1(
)(
ln1)(
µ
αµ
µ
αρδµα
γηη Z
KA
AKa
a
KD
P
.   (15) 
This leads us to the first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  (Optimal adaptation and capital stocks at steady-state). 
Let δ = 0. If the unique solution Kˆ  > 0 of the equation  
µ
µ
µ
α
µ
α
α δρδ
γη
α
ρ
α
ρ
ρ
α
PPA
KZ
A
K
K
A
)(
ˆ
11
ˆ
1ˆ
1
max
121
1 +
=
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−+⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
+
−
−
+
−
−
 
 (16) 
is such that D( Kˆ )≤ 0, then the optimal steady-state adaptationD is zero and the optimal 
capital level is K = Kˆ . Otherwise, the unique K > Kˆ is found from the nonlinear 
equation: 
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And the optimal adaptation D  is positive and given by (15).  
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Eq. (15) shows that if the capital stock K is too small, then the optimal adaptation 
level should be negative (because of the logarithm), which is not possible. Thus, the 
optimal solution is no adaptation. Such cases will occur when the economy under 
analysis is very poor. As a consequence, the vulnerability of the economy is maximal
max)0()( ηηη ==D  because the optimal adaptation level is zero. If the opportunities for 
adaptation are too narrow or if the economy is too poor, then it is optimal not to spend 
money on adaptation at all but to focus on mitigation. This preliminary result shows that 
it is optimal to invest in adaptation only under some balance between three ingredients, 
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each of which has an economic/environmental rationale. First, the wealth of the 
economy, represented by the level of its capital stockK , must be considered. A wealthier 
economy has a stronger incentive to invest in adaptation, and it is optimal not to invest in 
adaptation if the economy is too poor. Second, the technological potential for adaptation
)( minmax ηη −a  must be wide enough. This potential naturally depends on each country’s 
geographical and physical characteristics. A country located is an area highly sensitive to 
global warming (e.g., near oceans or mountains) is expected to offer a wider 
technological potential than others. Third, what we may call the environmental dirtiness 
ratio γ /δP also plays a key role. This ratio translates the fact that the actual detrimental 
impact of an economy on the environment depends not only on its polluting intensity 
γ  but also on the natural decay rate of the pollution stock δP. So, the results gathered in 
Proposition 1 have important policy implications. By anticipating forthcoming results, the 
proposition also suggests interesting insights when cooperation among countries will be 
considered. It shows that the countries that remain highly vulnerable to climate change 
will be the less developed ones. These results will come out again later in the multi-
country setting, with many new insights. 
 
3.3. The optimal domestic policy 
  
On the ground of Proposition 1 we can characterize the optimal climate policy of 
the country under study. To proceed further we need a corner stone, and this one will 
prove to be a key indicator of both the vulnerability of the economy and its pressure on 
the environment. This indicator is required for mathematical and is economically 
grounded. Every economy must in fact be characterized in both dimensions: it is 
vulnerable to pollution, but it also contributes to it. So, reducing pollution is a benefit 
(avoided damages) as well as a cost (mitigation efforts). The optimal policy mix between 
the two depends on both these physical characteristics and their economic counterparts 
and each country’s strategic position depends on both dimensions. So, we shall define 
what we call a κ-indicator of environmental harm and vulnerability. Naturally, this 
indicator is endogenous as depends on the country’s adaptation efforts. It writes as 
follows. 
Definition 1. The κ-indicator of environmental harm and vulnerability is defined as: 
µ
µ
δρδ
ηγ
ηκ
PP )(
)(
1
+
=
+
.     (18) 
 
The reader interested in the mathematical reasoning and importance of function 
(18) for the proofs is sent to Appendix. Beyond its mathematical properties, the indicator 
offers quite appealing economic intuitions.6 The κ-indicator defined by equation (18) 
combines both the pressure of human activity on the environment (the pollution intensity 
of production γ) and the pressure of the environment on welfare (the environmental 
                                                
6 This indicator was first introduced in Bréchet et al. (2013). 
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vulnerability of the economy η).7 An economy can be highly vulnerable to climate 
change because of the physical sensitivity to impacts (geography, infrastructure, 
location…) and/or subjective reasons (disutility), and/or its polluting intensity, which will 
influence its mitigation cost (through the opportunity cost of mitigation). This synthetic 
indicator captures the whole picture. It is important to stress again that the κ-indicator is 
endogenous. It depends on the domestic policy and, in particular, on the adaptation 
efforts D. Even if the vulnerability of an economy is something given beforehand by 
country’s physical characteristics, it is not gloom as it can be changed by an adequate 
adaptation policy. Because D is related to other policy instruments B and K, we cannot 
say that adaptation measures can be taken independently of other decisions.  
Because the adaptation is bounded from below (no adaptation) and from above 
(full adaptation), the κ-indicator is also bounded. We can easily define the two 
boundaries maxmin )( κηκκ ≤<  as cases where vulnerability is minimal and maximal, i.e.: 
)( minmin ηκκ =  and )( maxmax ηκκ = .         (19) 
The boundaries (19) are used in the proof of Proposition 1. In order to obtain 
approximate expressions for steady-state variablesK , B , C , D , P , let us consider two 
cases depending on whether the κ-indicator is large or small, defined as Case A and Case 
B below.  
Case A reflects a (brown) economy that is both very polluting but also heavily impacted 
by the global pollution. This boils down to assume a lower bound for κgiven by: 
α
α
ρ
κ
/1
1
min )1(1 ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+<<<< −aAZ .                                                  (20) 
The interpretation of the formal expression (20) of Case A is rather 
straightforward. The left inequality (20) imposes that the lower limiting value minκ  in 
(19) is large enough, which means that pollution impact is high and the economy cannot 
overcome all the adverse effects of pollution even when all adaptation measures are 
implemented. The second part of the inequality means that the ratio between the 
productivity level A and the discount factor ρ, and/or the adaptation efficiency a, and/or 
the external pollution are much larger than minκ . Although it really deserves to be 
documented for future researches, the USA or the UE would certainly match Case A.  In 
Bréchet et al. (2013) we show that Case A is also rather realistic on the ground of current 
world aggregate data. If Case A holds, then the optimal steady state capital is given by 
the approximate formula  
α
µρκ
α −
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
≅
1
1
min )1( Z
AK .                                                   (21) 
                                                
7In this sense, the κ-indicator represents a kind of theoretically reduced form of the DPSIR framework 
(Driving-Pressure-State-Impact-Response), showing that the interplay between the economy and the 
climate goes both ways (every economy is polluted and is a polluter at the same time) and combines both 
physical and subjective dimensions. 
K
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Here and thereafter, the notation f (ε)≅ g(ε) means that f (ε)=g(ε)[1+o(ε)] for 
some small parameter 0<ε<<1and f(ε)→g(ε) when ε→0. The proof of (21) is analogous 
to Bréchet et al. (2013).  
Case B describes a (green) economy with a lightly polluted environment, which boils 
down to assume: 
1max <<κ                                                          (22) 
In this case, the upper bound of maxκ  is not too large, which means that the vulnerability is 
low even without any adaptation. For Case B’s countries, the optimal steady state capital 
is determined by the approximate formula:  
α
µκ
ρ
α −+
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−≅
1
1
2
1
max )1(
AK            (23) 
By considering Cases A and B we are able to find the optimal steady-steady 
capital stockK from (21) or (23) as well as all the other steady-state variables B , C , D , 
P , which are explicitly determined by (8)-(10), (15) and Proposition 1. Equations (21) 
and (23) allow us to describe the optimal domestic climate policy of the country under 
study and to understand how it is shaped by its contribution to the global pollution flow.  
It is first enlightening to consider a world economy, i.e. the case when Z= 0 (see 
Bréchet et al. (2013) for further details). Mitigation and adaptation turn out to be 
substitutable policy instruments. For a given country, allowing for adaptation reduces 
mitigation efforts, as it can naturally be expected. The country can support a stronger 
global warming (so a larger pollution stock) when there exist adaptation measures 
capable to alleviate the related adverse effects. The size of the economy is thus larger. 
More interesting is the fact that the optimal policy mix between adaptation and mitigation 
is shaped by country’s wealth, in particular by its total factor productivity A. The optimal 
ratio D/B is bell-shaped: it is first increasing in A, and then decreasing. If the economy is 
too poor, optimal adaptation must be zero. As the country becomes richer, it should 
increase the share of adaptation in its policy mix, but after a while the contribution of 
adaptation should decrease and the one of mitigation should increase. A rich country 
should not spend too much on adaptation, but on mitigation. All these results hold for any 
Z > 0. 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the influence of Z on the policy mix. The 
analysis of formulas (21) and (23) demonstrates how the optimal size of the economy, 
adaptation, and mitigation depend on the external pollution stock Z and the country’s 
relative size (in terms of its contribution to the global pollution). 
 
Proposition 2 (Optimal domestic policy wrt country’s contribution to pollution) 
(i) The larger the country’s share in global pollution stock is (small Z), the larger its 
mitigation spending B , capital stock , output Y , and consumption C  levels are; 
K
K
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(ii) If the κ-indicator is small (κmax<<1), then the influence of Z on the domestic policy is 
weak; if the κ-indicator is high ( ), then capital  decreases in Z following 
(21), the consumption  is proportional to , while the output and mitigation expense 
decrease as ; 
(iii) The optimal adaptation D  starts earlier and increases with Z at κmax<<1. In the case 
of a high κ-indicator ( ), the optimal adaptation D decreases with Z when µ < 
(1−α)/α, and increases otherwise. 
Proof. See Appendix.  
 
The larger the country’s contribution to global warming, the better the country 
can control the global pollution stock by mitigating its own pollution and thus preserve its 
own welfare. So, there is a strong incentive to spend money on mitigation rather than on 
adaptation. Then, more income is required, so more capital and output. As a result, the 
size of the economy becomes larger. Naturally, this dependence is stronger when the 
pollution vulnerability is essential.  
As highlighted in the item (iii) of Proposition 2, the impact of Z on the optimal 
adaptation level D is less straightforward. It goes through two channels. Indeed, the 
optimal D is smaller (or even zero) if the economy is too poor (K very small). But on the 
other hand, Z directly increases pollution, and correspondingly the adaptation efforts by 
(15). The final effect depends on the κ-indicator and parameters µ and α. In particular, it 
is positive for a small κ-indicator. ThenK does not depend on Z by (23), therefore, 
increasing Z directly increases adaptation.  If theκ-indicator is large, both situations are 
possible and the key parameter is the pollution disutility µ . If µ is small (i.e. the disutility 
of pollution in (6) is almost linear), then the optimal adaptation level D decreases as the 
country’s contribution to pollution decreases (larger Z). But if the pollution disutility is 
large enough, µ > (1−α)/α, then the optimal adaptation level D increases with Z. The 
above condition on µ roughly corresponds to µ > 0.6 in the current world situation 
assuming the share of labor in outputα = 2/3. In other words, increasing the relevance of 
pollution in society’s objective leads to an increase of adaptation in absolute units even 
when the economy becomes weaker and all other economic characteristics become 
smaller (at a larger Z).   
Correspondingly, the impact of the country’s size on the optimal ratio D/B is 
stronger as µ is larger. Even when µ is small, then Z does not affect B and K by (21), 
while it still impacts the optimal adaptation level D. The reaction of optimal adaptation is 
thus much more complex. This will explain some of our results in the multi-country 
setting. We shall notice that, if the country size is small, then its welfare may become 
negative because of climate change adverse effects (the pollution P increases while both 
K and C  become small for large Ζ).  
 
 
1min >>κ K
C K
αK
1min >>κ
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4. The multi-country case 
 
Let us now explore the case of a multi-country world. For the sake of readability, 
we will first consider only two countries, and the generalization to n countries will be 
discussed in the last subsection. We are interested in comparing the optimal domestic 
climate policies in two scenarios: when each country maximizes its own welfare, and 
when both countries coordinate on the policy. The former is known as a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium, the latter as a cooperative solution. Because the pollution stock is 
common to both countries, it is clear that the Nash equilibrium is sub-optimal. The 
cooperative solution, on the other side, leads the world to a first best situation. Our 
purpose is not to analyze game theoretical issues related to cooperation (Breton et al. 
2006, Fanokoa et al. 2011, Legras and Zaccour 2011), but rather to scrutinize how 
domestic policies are shaped by cooperation. The usual result in the literature is that non-
cooperation leads to too low emission mitigation compared to what is socially optimal. 
We will see in this section that much more results can emerge when comparing Nash and 
cooperation. Actually, a general equilibrium standpoint allows showing that countries 
may look completely different between the two situations. This is not just a question of 
mitigation level, as usually discussed in the literature, but also of adaptation, capital stock 
and consumption levels. We start by characterizing the two scenarios (non-cooperation, 
then cooperation) and the comparison between the two will follow. 
 
4.1. The non-cooperative scenario 
Let us consider an economic-environmental system (the world) that consists of 
two countries that share the same pollution stock: Country 1 and Country 2. The external 
emission flow Z now becomes endogenous and results from the economic activity of 
Country 2: 
Z(t) = Y2(t)/B2(t).     (24)  
We assume that countries do not cooperate. Each one decides on its own policy 
by maximizing its utility function, taking the policy of the other country as given. The 
corresponding optimization problem is as follows: 
dttPtDtCe iii
t
CII iiDiK
∫
∞ +
−
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
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+
−
0
1
,,, 1
)())(()(lnmax
µ
η
µ
ρ ,   (25) 
under the constraints 
IKi(t) ≥ 0,   IDi(t) ≥ 0,     Ci(t) ≥ 0,          
Yi(t) = AiKiαi(t) = IKi(t) + IDi(t)  + Bi(t)+ Ci(t),   (26) 
Ki’(t) = IKi(t) −δKiKi(t),       Ki(0) = K0i,                                     (27) 
Di’(t) = IDi(t) −δDiDi(t),      Di(0) = D0i,    i = 1,2,   (28) 
P ’(t) = −δPP(t) + γ A1K1
α1(t)/B1(t) + γ A2K2
α2(t)/B2(t),       P(0) = P0.       (29)  
 
It is the dynamic continuous game of two players (Countries 1 and 2) with the 
pay-off functions (25), i=1,2. Each player solves the optimization problem (25)-(29) with 
its own endogenous variables: consumption Ci, investments in physical capital and in 
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adaptation IKi, IDi, and mitigation Bi, i = 1,2. The externality is the global pollution stock 
P. 
As the solution strategy for this game we use the classic open-loop Nash 
equilibrium (OLNE), which is a pre-commitment strategy (Long 2010). It assumes that 
each player maximizes its own payoff (25) by taking the other player’s OLNE decision as 
given.8 As before, we restrict ourselves to the comparative static analysis of the problem 
(25)-(29) and assume zero deterioration for the capital stocks in both countries: δKi = δDi = 
0. Similarly to Lemma 1, possible steady states K i, B i, C i, D i, P  for each player i 
=1,2 should satisfy (19)-(13) at Z =Y 3-i /B 3-i or the following system of nine equations 
,/ iiiii KKAB i αρ
α −=      (30) 
,/ iii KC αρ=        (31) 
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, i =1,2,  (34) 
with respect to K 1, K 2, B 1, B 2, C 1,C 2,D 1, D 2, and P . 
The existence of the Nash equilibrium for continuous dynamic games is not 
guaranteed. In our game (25)-(29), it depends on solvability of the nonlinear system (30)-
(34). Solving the game with asymmetric players is not feasible. So we will consider the 
symmetric case (two identical countries). Let: 
A1=A2, α1=α2, 2min1min ηη = ,     a1=a2,    b1=b2. (35) 
At (35), if the OLNE equilibrium state exists, it is the same for both players: K 1=
K 2=K N, B 1=B 2=B N, C 1=C 2=C N, D 1=D 2=D N, where the subscript N stands for 
Nash. Then, the equations (30)-(34) for the unknown K N, B N, C N, D N, and P N lead to  
,/αρα NNN KKAB −=     (36) 
,/αρNN KC =      (37) 
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8Another more recent strategy for dynamic games is the feedback or Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium 
strategy, when the decision depends on a current state. A technical advantage of OLNE is that it is 
relatively easy to calculate (Long 2010), which is imperative in such a complicated model as (25)-(29). We 
discuss other more practical reasons for choosing OLNE over the feedback strategy later in Section 3.4. 
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whereK N>0 is found from the nonlinear equation (16) at D N=0 and Z = αNKA /B Nor 
from (17) at D N>0,Z= αNKA /B N. 
As in Section 2, if condition (20) holds then the unique optimal K N  exists and is 
determined as: 
)1/(
1
1
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≅ KAK PPN .  
 
(40) 
If (22) holds: 1max <<κ , then the optimal K N is determined by the same 
approximate formula (23), i.e., KKN ≅ .  
The set of the same strategies K N, B N, C N, D N  for both players constitutes 
theopen-loop Nash equilibrium strategy in the game (25)-(29). Using (7) and (18), the 
corresponding optimal vulnerability function and κ–indicator are calculated as  
)( NN Dηη = ,  )( NN ηκκ = .      (41) 
It is clear that the Nash equilibrium does not yield the best cumulative payoff for 
the players. In many situations, the players might improve their own payoffs, as well as 
global welfare, by following some cooperative strategies. The next section considers that 
scenario. 
 
4.2. The cooperative scenario 
 
In this section we analyze the case of a full international cooperation in our two-
country world. It means that the countries coordinate the policy that maximizes their joint 
welfare. We assume that a benevolent social planner represents a multinational 
governmental body with complete control on the environmental policies of Countries 1 
and 2. The corresponding optimization problem is as follows: 
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IKi(t)≥0,   IDi(t) ≥0,     Ci(t) ≥0, 
under the constraints  (26)-(29). 
This problem is an extension of the optimization problem (1)-(6) with a double set 
of endogenous variables: the consumptions C1 and C2, the investments IK1, IK2, ID1, ID2, 
and the mitigation expenses B1 and B2 of Countries 1 and 2 respectively. The objective 
function describes the joint cumulative payoff of both countries. In such a case, the 
externality associated to the global pollution stock P is fully internalized and the outcome 
is the first best. The optimization problem includes six decision variables IK1, IK2, ID1, ID2, 
C1, C2, seven state variables K1, K2, D1, D2, B1, B2, P, and nine constraints-equalities (26)-
(29). Despite its double size, it can be treated analogously to the problem (1)-(6). 
Assuming δKi =δDi =δ and providing the comparative static analysis, we obtain the 
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following interior first order conditions for nine steady-state variables K i, B i, C i, D i, i 
= 1,2, and P :  
),( ρδαα α +=− iiiiii KBKA i     (43) 
,iiiiii CBDKKA i +++= δδ
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An analysis of the system (43)-(47) indicates the way of its sequential solution, 
which is the extension of the technique used in Section 2. Namely, assuming δ =0, the 
steady stateK i, B i, C i, D i, i =1,2, P  satisfies the system of nine nonlinear equations 
(30)-(33) and   
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This system differs from the Nash equilibrium case only by the equation (48). 
Substituting the expressions of D 1, D 2 and P  via K 1 and K 2 into (48), we obtain two 
nonlinear equations with respect to K 1 and K 2. This system of two equations is an 
analogue of the equation (14) for K  in the one country case. The solution is simple in the 
case (35) of symmetric countries. Then, by symmetry considerations, the steady state 
satisfies conditions K 1=K 2=K CO, B 1=B 2= B CO, C 1=C 2=C CO, D 1=D 2=D CO, 
where the subscript CO stands for “Cooperation”. Substituting the last expressions into 
the system (40)-(43),(66), we obtain the same equations (8)–(13) for the unknown K CO, 
B CO, C CO, D CO, P CO, in which δ = 0, Z = 0,butthe coefficient γ  is replaced by 2γ.   
As in Section 2, if condition (20) holds, then the unique optimal K CO is found as  
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If (22) holds, 1max <<κ , then the optimal K N is determined by the approximate 
formula  
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AcoK <
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−≅
−
+
+
+ α
µ
µ
µ
κ
ρ
α 1
1
2
1
max
2
1
)21( .             (50) 
 19 
After finding K N, the corresponding steady-state levels B CO, C CO, D CO, P CO, 
COη , and κCO  are also known, in particular,  
)( COCO Dηη = , )( COCO ηκκ = .     (51) 
We can now compare the optimal policy mix in the non-cooperative and 
cooperative scenarios. 
 
4.3. Comparing cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios in terms of domestic 
policies  
 
The comparison between the two scenarios will be carried out by comparing 
expressions (36)-(40) (Nash) and (49) (cooperation). This will confirm a couple of 
expected results, but also yield many unexpected ones. A naturally expected result is that 
pollution is too high in the non-cooperative scenario compared to the first best. 
Interestingly, the reasons why it is the case are not trivial at all. Namely, the first 
important result is that the size of economies sharply differs between two scenarios. This 
is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 (Size of the economy). The optimal steady state capital level is always 
larger in the non-cooperative case than under cooperation: CON KK > . If the κ-indicator 
of environmental harmfulness is small (κmax<<1), then the difference is small ( CON KK ≅
); if the κ-indicator is large, then the difference is large. Formally, if the condition (20) 
holds, then: 
CON KK
)1/(12 α−≅ ,   CON KY
)1/(2 αα −≅ .                                        (52) 
 
Proposition 3 states that the size of the economy is always too large in Nash 
equilibrium. This result will drive many other ones, as we will see later in this section. In 
other words, the lack of cooperation does not only lead to too much pollution but also 
(and maybe more importantly) to over accumulation of capital. Actually, the whole 
economy is much too fat in Nash. And it is even worse when the economy environmental 
harmfulness is high. In fact, the interpretation of Proposition 3 is rather intuitive. If the 
environmental self–cleaning capability δP is strong and the emission impact factor γ and 
environmental vulnerability η are negligible, then the pollution hardly affects the optimal 
policy. Indeed, in the case of a small maxκ (i.e.,
µµ ρδηγ P<<
+1 ), the Nash equilibrium and 
cooperative optimal strategies are similar and do not depend on environmental 
parameters. This property is illustrated in Figure 1, which also highlights that the gap 
between NK and COK monotonically increases from zero to the maximal factor 2
1/(1
−α
) as 
the environmental harmfulness increases. Figure 1 shows that it is optimal to shrink the 
environmentally vulnerable economy, which is intuitive, but it also reveals that the shrink 
is not strong enough under Nash. This occurs because countries are not able to effectively 
control the global pollution level when international cooperation fails.  
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In the case of large emission impact γ, environmental vulnerability η, economic 
and adaptation efficiencies A and a, and negligible environmental self–cleaning δP, the 
Nash value (50) of capital is 21/(1−α) times larger than the optimal capital amount (49) in 
the cooperative optimization problem. In this case, the Nash output levelY  is 2α/(1−α) 
timesclarger than the optimal one in the cooperative case. This also reveals that 
consumption and adaptation levels are much larger in Nash (than what they are in the 
cooperative scenario), which seems to be good for welfare. However, the pollution level 
is so high that it compensates for these two components. By the end, the resulting welfare 
is smaller. 
Let us now consider the climate policies and first concentrate on mitigation. In 
both scenarios, the optimal mitigation spending is determined by the same formula (30): 
it depends on the capital level only. So it can formally be analyzed separately from the 
adaptation decision. This does not mean that adaptation and mitigation are separate 
decisions (as we will see below), but it suggests that the policy-maker should try first to 
control the pollution flow (with mitigation spending) and then alleviates adverse impacts 
with adaptation. Mitigation NB  in Nash is thus larger than the optimal mitigation in 
cooperation COB . Countries spend too much on mitigation to try to keep the pollution 
flow under control. This is in sharp contrast with the current literature: in Nash, 
mitigation efforts are too large in dollars because the economy is too fat. In a certain 
sense, the lack of cooperation on the environmental common draws to wasteful 
economies: too much production is required to finance too much mitigation. It can be 
noted that, due to our assumptions about the pollution motion law (6), the pollution flow 
Y/B cannot decrease down to zero, which is realistic for greenhouse gases.  
What is the influence of country’s characteristics (the productivity parameter A 
and impatience rate ρ) on the optimal domestic policy? Such an analysis remains 
qualitatively the same as in Section 2 in both non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. 
The optimal policy mix between adaptation and mitigation BD / is initially zero for very 
small A(no adaptation is optimal). Then it grows with A and decreases later producing an 
inverted U-shape. When adaptation is positive, the size of the economy is larger, the 
pollution stock is larger, and mitigation efforts are smaller compared to the case with no 
adaptation. So, the policy mix displays the same qualitative properties in both scenarios. 
We know from equation (15) that adaptation is positive starting with some minimal 
capital threshold size. We also know that the capital sock is larger in Nash than in 
cooperation. This means that adaptation will start earlier, i.e., for poorer economies, in 
the absence of cooperation. This is an important result as it suggests that a large pollution 
stock is not the only reason why poor countries have to start adaptation. And a key policy 
implication is related to financial transfers among countries (adaptation funds): too much 
money is needed in developing countries for adaptation in absence of cooperation.   
Another result of interest is the following. In Nash, the optimal policy mix BD /
will reach its maximum for weaker economies (compared to the cooperative case). This is 
also illustrated in Figure 2. This shows that a definitive difference between cooperation 
and non-cooperation does not only lie in mitigation efforts, but also on the whole 
domestic policy mix.  
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All these results are summarized in the following statement. 
 
Proposition 4 (Optimal policy mix) In both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, 
optimal adaptation is zero when the total factor productivity A is too small; then, BD /  
increases with A and decreases later. In the absence of cooperation, adaptation becomes 
positive at smaller values of A and the maximum of BD /  is reached at smaller A than 
under cooperation. 
 
4.4. Generalization to n countries 
 
Until now we restricted our analysis to a two-country case for the sake of 
readability. Generalizing our results to n symmetric countries is straightforward. 
Proposition 2 holds replacing 2 by n. In particular, the Nash equilibrium output Y  will be 
nα/(1−α) times larger than the optimal output in the case of full cooperation. The Nash 
equilibrium capital K  will be n1/(1−α) times larger than the capital in cooperative case. In 
summary, the Nash strategy in a multi-country world under study involves 
overproduction, which leads to overconsumption, over-pollution and over-adaptation. 
The primary problem comes from overproduction that appears because the country 
controls only its own pollution emission (so, a decrease in production causes much 
smaller decrease of pollution emissions than in the cooperative scenario). The 
corresponding adaptation investment depends on both production and pollution, so over-
adaptation is the result of overproduction. All the results proved in the two-country model 
hold for n symmetric countries. 
 
4.5. A short discussion about open-loop versus Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium 
 
There are several important reasons for choosing the open-loop Nash equilibrium 
(OLNE) strategy over the Markov-perfect (feedback) Nash equilibrium strategy (Long, 
2010) in our model.  
First of all, the players are countries and as such are a priori less manipulative and 
more committed to planned actions as compared to, say, separate firms or private agents. 
Second, the anticipatory nature of the majority of adaptation projects requires careful 
preliminary design and multi-year investments, which matches well the OLNE 
assumption that each player knows the other player’s optimal strategy (which is the same 
as her own). For the same reason, we have chosen our adaptation control D as the stock 
of adaptation capital, which takes years to build. In the case of the feedback Nash 
equilibrium strategy, each player can instantaneously change their optimal decision if the 
measured value of the state variable (pollution in our case) deviates from its anticipatory 
optimal Nash value.  
The other reason is a posteriori. The 2α/(1−α)–fold overproduction in the non-
cooperative case under the assumption (20) seems quite extreme and demonstrates that 
our stylized model possibly omits some features of process such as capital deterioration, 
see (Yatsenko et al. 2014) for a more detailed discussion. On the other hand, it is well 
known that the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy leads to larger pollution 
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emission and overproduction in pollution games than OLNE does (Long 2010, p. 10-12). 
It gives us a sensible motive to stay with OLNE in our adaptation-mitigation policy 
analysis.  
 
5. Conclusion and rooms for research 
 
In this paper we developed a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model to 
understand how international cooperation shapes domestic policies. Our model is built 
upon the classic Solow-Swan framework and captures essential nonlinearities in 
production and pollution dynamics. Its contribution to the literature is in the following 
insights. First, the optimal mitigation effort is always positive for all involved countries.9 
Second, the optimal ratio between adaptation and mitigation is zero for poor countries, 
maximal for middle-income countries, and it decreases but remains positive as the 
country becomes richer. Buob and Stephan (2011) agree that the adaptation is zero for 
poor countries, but they obtain a polar result that the richest regions should invest in 
adaptation only. Third, the non-cooperative (Nash) strategy in the multi-country world 
leads to overproduction, overconsumption, over-pollution and over-adaptation in 
comparison to cooperative case. This result could not be displayed by Buob and Stephan 
(2011) because production is exogenous.   
We shall notice that our analysis is limited to the symmetrical case (identical 
countries). Extending our model to a multi-country model with asymmetry among 
countries would be highly desirable to address strategic behavioral differences between 
rich and poor countries, but it raises additional mathematical challenges and we leave it 
for further research. Nevertheless, our modeling approach with an exogenous pollution 
flow proves to be an appealing simple way of introducing heterogeneity in terms of 
country size. Several rooms for model extensions can be borrowed from the 
environmental games, following, e.g., Fanokoa et al. (2011) or Eyland and Zaccour 
(2014). We are planning to consider a two-player asymmetric pollution-control 
differential game where one player is non-vulnerable to pollution. It may simplify 
analytics and lead to interesting insights. Another potential idea is to use a border tax 
instead of a cooperative international agreement (Eyland and Zaccour, 2014). In terms of 
Breton et al. (2006), our model describes an “autarky” adaptation. Its possible extension 
to access merits of cooperation is in considering the “joint implementation” when players 
can invest into adaptation at home and abroad (where adaptation costs are lower). 
Multiple interacting pollutants with synergetic effects can be considered as in Legras and 
Zaccour (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 In contrary, in Buob and Stephan (2011), regions can invest in mitigation or in adaptation only (or neither 
in adaptation nor mitigation), and the regions completely switch from mitigation to adaptation as the 
number of regions becomes large, which does not happen in our model. 
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Appendix. 
Proof of Lemma 1is analogous to (Yatsenko et al. 2014) for the case Z = 0. The current-
value Hamiltonian for the problem (1)-(7) is  
,)()()/(
)()
1
)((ln
231432
1
1
CIIDIKIZBAKP
CBIIAKPDCeH
DKDKP
DK
t
µµµδλδλγγδλ
λ
µ
η
α
α
µ
ρ
+++−+−+++−+
−−−−+
+
−=
+
−
(A1) 
where the dual variables λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are associated with equalities (2)-(5) and µ1, µ2, µ3 
reflect the irreversibility constraints. Deriving the first order conditions for IK, ID, C ,K, B, 
P, D from (A1) and excluding the dual variables, we obtain the following nonlinear 
system for possible interior optimal trajectories K, B, C, D and P : 
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Next, we analyze possible steady states of the problem under study. By (A2)-(A6), any 
positive constant (stationary) state (K , B , C , D , P ) of the problem (1)-(6), if it exists, 
should satisfy the following system of nonlinear equations: 
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The rest of the proof follows (Yatsenko el al 2014). Lemma is proven.  
 
Proofof Proposition 1 extends the analysis of Brechet et al (2013) for Ζ = 0 and includes 
similar steps. Namely, substituting (15) into (14), we get the equation (17). Next, 
introducing the dimensionless unknown variable α
α
ρ −= 1K
A
x , 0 <x < 1, and the 
parameters  
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we obtain from (17) the equation 
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The left-hand side 
x
xxF
µ+−
=
2)1()(  of equation (A13) strictly decreases from ∞ at x = 0 
to 0)1( =F  and is the same as in the case Z = 0. The right-hand function  
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strictly decreases from ∞ at x = 0 to minκ  at x = 1 (exactly as at Z= 0).  
Similarly to (Brechet et al 2013), now we can prove that, if ( )( ) 0/ˆ )1/(1 >−αρα xAD ,  where 
xˆ is the solution of the equation  
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then the functions F(x) and G(x) intersect at a unique point x*, xˆ <x* < 1, and, therefore, 
the equation (A13)  has a unique solution. The proposition is proven.  
Proof of Proposition 2.The case of a small κ-indicator (κmax<<1) is obvious. Let us 
focus on the case (20) when the κ-indicator is high. Then, the dimensionless unknown  
α
α
ρ −= 1K
A
x , introduced in the proof of Proposition 1 is small: 0 <x << 1. 
Correspondingly, by (8) and (9),  
ααα αραρ KAAKKABKC ≈−== − ))/(1(          ,/ 1 .   
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Finally, )(KD  is defined by (15). Assuming (20) and substituting (21) into (15), we 
obtain that [ ] ( )
⎭
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⎨
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++ +−− 11
1
1)1(ln~)( µαµ ZZZD . So, D  increases in Z when µ < (1−α)/α. 
This completes the proposition proof. 
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Figure 1. The dependence of the optimal economy size K on the environmental 
vulnerability indicator κ in the competitive OLNE case (dotted curve KN) and the 
cooperative case (solid curve KCO). The size is the same ( ) )1/(1max /
αρα −= AK at κ= 0. The 
ratio KN / KCO approaches  21/(1−α) when κ  increases and becomes large. 
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Figure 2.The dependence of the optimal adaptation–mitigation ratio D/B on the country 
productivity A in the competitive OLNE case (solid curve) and the cooperative case 
(dashed curve). 
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